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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

SOME DOUBTS CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL TO
ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY DIRECT
POPULAR VOTE
ALBERT

J.

ROSENTHALt

THE GROWING INTEREST IN, and support for, proposals to change the method of electing the President of the
United States,1 the recent Symposium on the subject in the Villanova.
Law Review2 is particularly timely. Equally welcome is the invitation
for additional commentary on the subject.
The faults in the existing method of choosing our Presidents are
well known. The current drive to replace it with direct nationwide
popular election has obvious appeal - so obvious in fact that it has
garnered much uncritical support. Concentration upon the defects in
the present system, however, may have diverted attention from possible
shortcomings in the substitute proposed. The purpose of this Comment
is to point out some of them.
Although the provision for choice of the President was one of the
few parts of the proposed Constitution to escape widespread criticism
in the ratification debate,3 it has been a source of almost continuous
dissatisfaction and controversey ever since and has probably generated
more proposed amendments than any other provision of the Constitution. Despite the attention long focused on the subject, however,
analysis had been hampered by the inability of observers to explain a
notable paradox: when the electoral vote of a State was divided by its
population, a single voter in a small State was represented by a larger
fraction of an elector than one in a large State; yet politicians and
amateurs alike knew that somehow the influence of each large-State
voter was greater than that of his counterpart in a small State.
The superb mathematical analysis presented by Mr. John Banzhaf'
disposes of this problem by demonstrating how and why the large-State
WrITH

t Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B., University of Pennsylvania,
1938; LL.B., Harvard University, 1941. The assistance of Mr. Bennett H. Last of the

Class of 1968, Columbia Law School, in the preparation of this Comment is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See, e.g., N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT (1968); COMMISSION ON
ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT (1967),
reprinted in 53 A.B.A.J. 219; COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL LEGISLATION, BAR ASS'N OF
THE CITY OF N.Y., PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT

PROVIDING FOR DIRECT

ELECTION OF PRESIDZNT AND VICE PRESIDENT (1967).

2. Reflections on the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 303 (1968).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 457 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton) : "The mode
of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of
the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which
has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents ......
4. Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral
College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 304 (1968).
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voter does in fact exert a disproportionately large influence on the final
result. His contribution constitutes a major breakthrough and should
clear the way toward a better understanding of the entire problem and
a rational basis for its solution.
In addition to delineating the degree of advantage accorded the
large-State voter by the present system, Mr. Banzhaf demonstrates the
even greater disparities in favor of small-State voters which would
follow adoption of either the proportional system5 or the district plan'
Which were urged upon Congress during the last two decades and are
still advocated by Senators Sparkman' and Mundt' respectively in their
contributions to this Symposium. I do not understand Mr. Banzhaf,
however, to be asserting that it is necessary that we adopt the one
device which would ensure that the principle of "one man, one vote"
would be applied in presidential elections - the nationwide direct
popular vote. Senator Bayh9 and Mr. Peirce, 1° however, do draw this
conclusion from his study. It is this conclusion, and not Mr. Banzhaf's
analysis, that I feel impelled to question.
It is hard to quarrel with the view that equal influence among all
voters in the nation is a desirable goal. If we regard the method of
electing the President in isolation, the case for a direct nationwide
popular vote would be strong indeed. But despite the tremendous
importance of the Presidency in our total political life, it is not the only
significant force. In 1956, when a freshman Senator named John
F. Kennedy scored brilliantly in opposing suggested constitutional
amendments to substitute the proportionate or the district systems for
the present electoral college method, he was able to point to the many
countervailing disadvantages imposed upon the voters in the large
cities and the large States." As Mr. Peirce points out, some of these
factors have been removed ;12 the Supreme Court has since outlawed
malapportionment in State legislatures13 and unfair districting of congressional delegations. 4 He concludes that one can no longer justify
favoring one group of voters in the election of the President in order
5. Id. at 318-19, 330.
6. Id. at 320-21, 331.
7. Sparkman, Reflections on the Electoral College - Comment, 13 VILL. L.
Rvv. 338 (1968).
8. Mundt, Reflections on the Electoral College - Comment, 13 VILL. L. Rev.

336 (1968).
9. Bayh, Reflections on the Electoral College - Comment, 13 VILL. L. Rev.
333 (1968).
10. Peirce, Reflections on the Electoral College - Comment, 13 VILL. L. Rzv.
342 (1968). See also N. PIRC4, supra note 1, passim.
11. 102 CONG. Rc. 5150 (1956).
12. Peirce, supra note 10, at 344 n.4.
13. E.g., Reynolds .v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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to balance its disadvantages in electing other officials. 1" But even if
some of these inequalities have been removed, many others remain.
First of all, it is not yet clear that the legislative reapportionment
decisions are going to stick. Powerful political forces have come within
a hair's breadth of getting the Senate to propose an amendment overturning Reynolds v. Sims,'6 at least in part. Despite the defeat, thus
far, of this effort in the Senate the same goal is now being attempted
through an effort to convoke a new constitutional convention." Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in Wesberry v. Sanders s requiring
approximately equal congressional districts within a State has been
sought to be stalled through congressional action.'" Certainly, if urban
interests are to surrender their advantages in exchange for the release
by rural districts of the edge they have had for so many years, they may
rightly insist that the other half of the bargain be honored.
Moreover, even if we assume that these changes are permanent,
there remains a number of other political handicaps imposed upon the
large States. Most obvious is the rule of "one state, two votes" in the
Senate, which is frozen into the Constitution beyond the reach even
of the amendment process.2" There is no need to append to this Comment a table comparable to those of Mr. Banzhaf, illustrating the fact
that a voter in Alaska has 74 times as much influence in the Senate as
a voter in New York - a degree of inequality many times as great
as the advantage conferred upon the New Yorker in the election of
the President. 2 '
Often overlooked is the further discrimination against the larger
States in the very process of amending the Constitution. Under the
normal method, three agencies participate - the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the State legislatures. 2 As to the last two of
these, New York and Alaska have precisely the same influence.
15.
16.
17.
(1968);

(1968).

Peirce, supra note 10, at 344-45.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See Swisher & Nelson, In Convention Assembled, 13 VILL. L. Rev. 711
Symposium on the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. Rgv. 837

18. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. See H.R. 5505, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; H.R. 2508, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) ; N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1967, at 27, col. 4.
20. Article V of the United States Constitution provides in part: "[N]o State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."
21. While issues in American politics rarely are polarized along large-State versus
small-State lines, the disproportionate strength accorded in the Senate to the interests
of the small States may on occasion be reflected in an ultimate decision of that body.
For example, support for the fair housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (Supp. 1968), was somewhat, if not dramatically,
stronger in the larger States than in the nation as a whole. As a consequence, in the
first three attempts to secure cloture in the Senate, fewer than two-thirds of the
Senators voting supported cloture; yet cloture was supported by Senators representing
over two-thirds of the population.
22. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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There seems, therefore, no need for those whose influence in the
election of the President may be slightly augmented by the present
system to apologize for their reluctance to surrender this advantage, in
the light of the overwhelming disadvantages the same voters have in so
many other facets of the political process.
More important than considerations of theoretical allocation of
political power are the practical aspects of what is proposed. Mr.
Peirce rightly points out that apologists for the present system are
desirous of preserving such political strength as urban and Negro
interests may be able to exert in the selection of the President.2" But
surely these are influences which ought to be strengthened, rather than
weakened, in the present critical period. In theory, of course, big cities
need not necessarily be in big States, and Negroes need not necessarily
be concentrated in either. But seven of our eight largest cities24 are
in the seven States which have the largest electoral vote and which
have the largest percentage of "excess voting power" in Mr. Banzhaf's
analysis. 25 And the large and increasing concentration of Negroes in
urban centers is common knowledge. 6 We should not deceive ourselves into ignoring the fact that a reduction of the voting strength of
the large States will mean a loss of political strength of urban and
Negro voters.
There is some reason to believe that the present plight of the cities
may be traced to the long-continued dominance of State legislatures
and Congress by rural interests. What is more important, however,
is that the cities need help now, financial help above all, but other kinds
of assistance as well, and that the federal government is far and away
the most effective possible source of such help. Similarly, the partly
related matter of improving the plight of the Negro - economically,
educationally, socially, psychologically - cries out for massive federal
action. Together, these twin and intertwined problems represent by
far the most serious domestic threat to the nation today, probably the
most serious in a century. To the extent that presidential leadership
23. Peirce, supra note 10, at 344.

24. 1960 census figures rank New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia,

Detroit, Baltimore, Houston and Cleveland, in that order. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT Or
THA UNITh-D STATES 12-13 (86th ed. 1965). All but Baltimore are in the seven largest
States. Id. at 19-20.
25. Banzhaf, supra note 4, at 329.
26. Over two-thirds of the Nation's Negroes outside of the South are concentrated
in our 12 largest cities. REPORT Or THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 118 (1968).
27. The principal burden for funding the programs we have proposed will fall
upon the Federal Government. Caught between an inadequate and shrinking tax
base and accelerating demands for public expenditures, the cities are not able to
generate sufficient financing. Although there is much more that state government
can and should do, the taxing resources available at this level are far from
adequate.
Id. at 251.
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can influence the speed and dimensions of the response of the federal
government to these problems, can we afford to diminish the likelihood
that our Presidents will be committed to those objectives? Is the
federal government even now doing a fraction of what it should?
Should the balance of power be altered in a direction likely to cause it
to do even less?
A change in the method of electing the President involves much
more than the possibility of turning the losing candidate into the winner
and vice versa. The mathematics of the election process must inevitably be highly influential in the selection of nominees. If it is true
that urban interests may cast the decisive vote under the present
method, consideration of their preferences may affect the choice of
the party conventions.
Moreover, once elected, a President who hopes for reelection (or
who, if not running, hopes that his successor will be a member of his
own party) is likely to be influenced in a myriad of decisions by the
political strength of those forces likely to carry decisive weight in
the next election. That which reduces the power of the urban interests - and, presumably with it the influence of Negroes - will to
that extent decrease the likelihood of the nomination of candidates
sympathetic to those interests, and may diminish the concern for those
interests shown by any incumbent President.
Changing problems, changing regional attitudes, may neutralize
or even reverse the factors I have mentioned. Urban and suburban
"backlash" might weaken the pro-civil rights influence of the metropolitan areas, while a new generation of liberals in the less populous
parts of the Midwest or even the South might someday assume the
leadership of the civil rights movement. The time may come when the
proposed change will seem more acceptable. But as of now, the best
hope of the Negroes still rests in the maximizing of the political influence of the urban areas. And certainly, it is the cities themselves
which must be in the forefront of the drive to get help to solve the
cities' problems. This would seem to be the worst possible time to
reduce their influence.
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